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IRRESISTIBLE FORCES AND POLITICAL OBSTACLES:
SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM AND THE STRUCTURAL
REGULATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
John W. Cioffi*
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in reaction to the
enormous political pressures generated by the wave of corporate
financial scandals during 2001-2002. The Act’s innovative reforms
of corporate governance law were shaped by powerful political
constraints on the use of private litigation and tensions over the
use of “structural regulation” to alter the internal governance
structures and procedures of publicly traded corporations. The
conservative political realignment during 1990s precluded the
development or expansion of litigious enforcement mechanisms
(i.e., private causes of action) to curb corporate and managerial
financial misconduct. Consequently, a number of the SarbanesOxley Act’s core provisions took the form of structural regulation
intended to function as non-litigious, self-executing mechanisms
of regulation. Political constraints on the use of private litigation
as an enforcement mechanism entailed a more direct intervention
of state power within the corporation and blurred the established
boundaries between the public and private spheres. However, the
legislative reforms did not alter the core processes of corporate
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managerial power—the nomination and election of directors to the
board. When the SEC attempted to do so, it threatened
encroachment on the private sphere and the institutional bases of
managerial power and autonomy and produced a backlash by
business elites against further reforms and against the underlying
logic of Sarbanes-Oxley itself.

I. INTRODUCTION
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20021 was the most significant reform
of American securities and corporate governance law since the
New Deal. The reforms are part of a long history of political
struggle over the form, power, and legitimacy of the corporation
and financial capital. Yet the Sarbanes-Oxley Act also represents a
sharp break with nearly two centuries of American federalism and
established forms of corporate governance regulation. The central
puzzle of American corporate governance reform is how and why
Congress passed such significant reform during a politically
conservative era in which corporate and managerial power were at
a zenith, and why it took such a novel form. The answer to both
parts of the puzzle is contextually and historically contingent.
First, extraordinary conditions of stock market crashes and
corporate financial scandals temporarily disrupted interest group
politics and partisan divisions to allow substantial legal and
institutional change. Second, political constraints on the use of
litigation as a means of addressing managerial financial fraud and
abuse impelled legislators to embrace alternative mechanisms of
regulation as part of the reforms. Financial crisis and political
constraints provided the conditions for regulatory innovation.
As forged by post-New Deal regulatory politics and the post-war
liberal legalism of the 1960s and 1970s, regulation in the United

1

Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection (Sarbanes-Oxley)
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as scattered
sections of 11, 15 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.). Passed by both the House and Senate on
July 25, 2002; signed into law by President George W. Bush on July 30, 2002.

2006]

IRRESISTIBLE FORCES AND POLITICAL OBSTACLES

3

States is typically highly prescriptive and litigious. Institutionally
fractured by federalism and the separation of powers, shot through
with multiple veto points, and lacking the more autonomous
administrative bureaucracies and neo-corporatist bargaining
arrangements common in many advanced industrial countries, the
United States developed a distinctive form of legalistic regulation
(Kagan, 2001; Keleman, 2004; Cioffi, 2004b). Regulatory politics
has tended to produce detailed prescriptive rules and enforcement
through private litigation. This form of legal ordering constitutes
the private sphere as a broad zone of presumptive autonomy for
economic actors and defines their relations as predominantly
those among private parties enforcing private rights through
litigation. Yet in recent years, political conflict over the scope,
role, and litigious means of enforcing regulatory norms has grown
increasingly intense.
The internal structure and governance of the corporation in the
United States has long been defined by detailed prescriptive
transparency and disclosure regulation under federal securities
law, as well as minimal mandatory legal requirements concerning
the internal form and operation of the firm under state corporation
law (Cioffi, 2004a, 2004b). This established pattern began to
change with the federal corporate governance reforms that
followed the wave of financial scandals that began with the
collapse of Enron in 2001. Political theories of regulation would
predict either that the veto-prone political structure of the United
States would have allowed powerful interest groups to block
significant legal and regulatory reforms (cf. Tsebelis, 1995) or,
alternatively, that reforms would remain within the established
trajectory of increasingly detailed prescriptive (or proscriptive)
legal rules reinforced by additional litigation-driven remedies
(Kagan, 2001). Alternative theories of regulation and economic
governance proposed by a number of scholars may anticipate new
forms of law and regulation but do not adequately address the
political dynamics capable of producing such regulatory
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innovations.2 This article takes issue with both general theoretical
perspectives.
Significant reforms did follow in the wake of the post-Enron
corporate governance crisis but they did not expand or create new
avenues for litigation. Instead, many of the reforms passed by
Congress in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and those later
adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission took a
strikingly different path—one that I label structural regulation,
through the restructuring of institutional and organizational
arrangements within the private sphere to effect policy goals of
improved corporate governance, managerial accountability, and
financial market legitimacy. This article analyzes how and why
corporate governance reform in the United States overrode interest
group and partisan politics, departed from the established forms
and federalist patterns of regulation, and remained cabined by
political constraints that may limit the effectiveness of regulatory
innovations.
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in response to
the collapse of the American stock markets and the subsequent
wave of corporate financial scandals during 2001-2002. The stock
market crashes, dot.com failures, the seemingly endless
disclosures of financial fraud and manipulation accompanied by
the largest corporate collapses in American history, represented
massive failures of market, corporate, and regulatory institutions.
A crisis of investor confidence and, ultimately, of the broader
legitimacy of the American political economic order compelled

2

There are a wide array of such re-conceptualizations of regulation and the
regulatory state. See, for example, Teubner, 1983 (“reflexive law”); Stewart,
1986 (“reconstitutive law”); Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992 (“responsive
regulation”); Freeman, 1997 (“collaborative governance”); Krawiec, 2003
(“negotiated governance”). Each in its own way seeks to address the rigidities,
inefficiencies, conflicts, and other undesirable attributes of regulation in an
advanced industrial political economy, yet they do not describe how law and
regulatory politics characteristically work in the United States.
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Congress to act quickly to pass reform legislation that could never
have been passed under ordinary conditions.
The regulatory innovations of the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms were
shaped by powerful political constraints on the use of private
litigation to curb managerial financial misconduct. During the
mid-1990s, hostility towards litigation as a mechanism of legal
and regulatory enforcement culminated in the passage of federal
securities litigation reform laws and since then has become an
entrenched feature of federal legislative politics. Given the
political constraints on using private litigation, congressional
proponents of reform could not use traditional litigious
mechanisms of enforcement to protect shareholder interests.
Instead, they pursued an incremental federalization of the
structural components of corporate law as the favored mode of
regulatory reform. As a result, the Sarbanes-Oxley corporate
governance legislation employed mechanisms of structural
regulation that work by altering the institutional structure and
internal functioning of the corporate form and board of directors,
rather than rules enforceable through private litigation. These
structural alterations of the corporation were designed to curb
managerial
abuses
through
non-litigious,
self-executing
mechanisms of regulation. Sarbanes-Oxley federalized core
features of corporate law that had long been the province of the
states. In doing so, the reforms’ use of structural regulation
revealed the constitutive force of the public sphere, through law
and regulation, on the ostensibly private sphere of the corporation.
The exigencies of post-1990s corporate governance reform and the
political legacy of anti-litigation politics of the 1990s produced a
paradox: the political constraints on the use of litigious
enforcement mechanisms led to an even more extensive and
intensive forms of governmental regulatory power over corporate
affairs. The inability to use private litigation as an enforcement
mechanism resulted in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s path-breaking
expansion of federal authority over the internal structure and
affairs of the corporation and a more direct intrusion of
governmental power into what had been largely regarded as the

6
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autonomous private sphere of the corporate firm. Ultimately, this
encroachment on the institutional bases of managerial power and
autonomy, and attempts to build upon it by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, prompted a backlash by business against
further reforms and against portions of Sarbanes-Oxley itself.
This article examines the vacillations of American securities
regulation from the mid-1990s through the enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. There are three basic findings: (1)
under conditions of severe and persistent market failures state
actors marshaled the political forces driving reform to increase
regulatory intervention in the private sphere; (2) clashing partisan
political agendas induced the form of corporate governance
regulation towards structural regulation; and (3) the failure to
alter the way in which directors are nominated and elected
reflected the limits of structural reform and regulation under the
prevailing conditions of American politics and economic
organization. These findings are supported by an analysis of
successive waves of “backlash” politics, in which legislators and
partisan coalitions seize the initiative before the veto-prone logjam
of pluralistic American politics reasserts itself. This history is
presented in three stages. The first covers the politics of securities
litigation reform of the mid to late-1990s. The second deals with
the legislative and regulatory corporate governance reforms of
2001-2004. The last phase encompasses a growing business
backlash against reform and the expanding regulatory intervention
in corporate affairs.

II. ANTECEDENTS OF STRUCTURAL REGULATION IN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. THE FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE CAPITALISM AND THE
FEDERALIST LEGACY
Corporation law always had a structural component that
instantiated the institutional minima of the corporate form and its
governance. This structural framework has inevitably had a
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regulatory effect on corporate governance by allocating power and
influencing the behavior of stakeholders within the corporation.
th
th
Over the course of the 19 and 20 Centuries, the structural and
fiduciary elements of corporation law became less restrictive and
increasingly ineffective in constraining managerial and corporate
actions. Yet as the federal government established a national
framework of securities law and regulation, the core functions of
state corporation law in defining the basic corporate governance
structures and fiduciary duties of directors and officers remained
intact. Federalism in corporate governance law remained
surprisingly stable during a long era of federal government
expansion and regulatory centralization.
Corporation law has always provided for the minimum structural
features and requirements of corporate governance. Within the
constraints of state corporation law, corporate charters established
the business purposes of the corporation, created the classes of
stock, and defined shareholder voting rights and procedures. In the
19th Century, prior to development of modern securities law,
corporate law was virtually the only body of law governing
corporate affairs and protecting investors. The powers granted to
the corporate firm and their structural allocation within it under
state corporate law constrained managerial behavior. In particular,
state law restrictions on the corporate ownership of stock impeded
mergers and acquisitions. New Jersey and then Delaware adopted
more laissez faire corporation laws which triggered a swift erosion
of these restrictions on corporate capacities and managerial
conduct nationwide. This liberalizing “Delaware effect” facilitated
the first great merger boom in American history at the end of the
19th Century and shaped the form of managerial capitalism that
would characterize the United States for a century. However, as
the strictures of corporation law loosened, the scale of enterprises
grew more massive, and the separation of ownership from
corporate control became ever more apparent, the legitimacy of
the new managerialism became the focus of intensifying political
debate from the Progressive Era through the New Deal.

8
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Proposals to federalize corporate law as a means of eliminating the
“Delaware effect” and the resulting “race to the bottom” were
th
th
debated repeatedly during the late 19 and early 20 Centuries, but
could never overcome the resistance of state officials and
constituencies, political conservatives, and managerial elites. This
prolonged debate over the legitimacy of corporate capitalism and
managerialism culminated with the New Deal, but still did not
result in a federal corporation law. Instead, federal legislation and
regulation was directed towards financial markets and their
regulation that were more clearly national in scope and impact.
The Securities Act of 1933 mandated disclosure standards for
3
initial public offerings of stock on publicly traded markets. The
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 created a transparency and
disclosure regime covering publicly traded stocks after their initial
offering and designed primarily to ensure adequate information
flowed to investors to strengthen and legitimate securities
markets.4 The 1934 Act also laid the foundations of modern
securities regulation by creating the Securities and Exchange
Commission, enabling extensive agency rule making, and granting
the SEC administrative enforcement powers. Yet the legacy of the
old federalist structure remained. The post-New Deal corporate
governance regime established a rough division of labor between
securities law and state corporation law. The latter for the most
part continued to govern the corporation’s internal structure and
relationships.5

3

15 U.S.C. § 77a-z.

4

15 U.S.C. § 78aa-mm.

5

For example, this division was made explicit in the DC Circuit’s decision in
Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990), in which the court
ruled that Securities and Exchange Act did not grant the SEC regulatory
authority over the internal affairs of listed corporations and held that SEC rules
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The New Deal legislation did encroach on one traditional subject
of state corporation law. The Securities and Exchange Act
federalized shareholder proxy voting as part of a broader regulation
of
corporate
(or
more
realistically,
management’s)
communications with shareholders. This placed control over one
of the most structurally sensitive of all corporate governance
functions in the hands of federal regulators. However, federal
legislation and SEC proxy regulations gave management de jure
and de facto control over the proxy process and thus over the
nomination and election of the board of directors. By effectively
giving managers the power to choose their ostensible overseers,
the federal regime entrenched managerial power and authority
within the corporation.
The federal regime contained a number of other structural
approaches to securities and corporate governance regulation. The
Investment Company Act of 19406 encroached on traditional state
law governing the composition of boards and the qualifications of
directors of investment funds. The 1940 Act employed a modest
form of structural regulation by prohibiting investment
companies, such as mutual funds, from having fewer than forty per
cent of its board comprised of independent directors, or a majority
of its board comprised of representatives of a single bank.7 The
failure of federal securities law and disclosure regulation to
prevent corporate corruption and foreign bribery scandals during

prohibiting dual class shares with unequal voting rights were beyond the scope
of the agency’s delegated powers.
6

15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 through a-64.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-10. However, “business development companies,” essentially
publicly traded private equity firms that were exempted from some
requirements of the Investment Company Act under a 1980 amendment, must
have a majority of disinterested directors (those unaffiliated with the company’s
sponsor and investment adviser). See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-55(a). The increase in the
required number of independent directors from the original 1940 Act to the
1980 amendments suggests the growing currency of board independence as an
alternative form of regulation.
7
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the 1970s resulted in yet another experiment in structural
regulation. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 ostensibly
required corporations to adopt internal controls and monitoring
8
procedures to prevent corrupt business practices. Perhaps most
importantly, the New York Stock Exchange listing rules, adopted
in 1977 under pressure from the SEC, required that the boards of
public companies form audit committees comprised entirely of
independent directors. The listing rules are particularly important
to the politics and regulation of corporate governance in that they
have given the SEC a way to gain regulatory leverage over the
internal governance of listed firms, otherwise denied it by judicial
interpretations of the federal securities laws (See Chandler and
Strine, 2002: n.12).
Federal proxy voting rules and the Investment Company Act’s
independent director provisions failed to appreciably reallocate
power within publicly traded corporations and investment funds.
Similarly, the FCPA’s internal control and monitoring
requirements are widely viewed as ineffective and largely a
failure.9 And the NYSE independent director and audit committee
rules had minimal impact on the actual functioning of boards and
corporate governance. These nascent forms of structural regulation
maintained or replicated the managerialism that had already
established itself as a defining characteristic of American corporate
capitalism. Structural regulation as a check on managerial power
was largely abandoned in favor of prescriptive formal regulation
and market reinforcing disclosure rules. This followed an enduring
pattern in which the disclosure requirements securities law and
regulation largely eclipsed corporation law during most of the
New Deal and post-war eras. Financial transparency secured by
federal disclosure rules and substantial rates of litigation drove the

8

9

See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd–3; 15 U.S.C. § 78(m)(b)(2)-(6).

See, e.g., U.S. Senate, 2003 (report detailing failure of federal enforcement
officials to pursue IRS warnings of foreign corrupt practices by Enron).
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American corporate governance system, rather than the structural
10
or fiduciary features of state corporation law.
This eclipse of state corporation law came to a sudden and
dramatic end in the ferocious battles over hostile takeovers during
the 1980s. Although tender offers and hostile takeovers emerged
during the 1960s and increased in incidence during the 1970s, the
dramatic surge in their number and scale during the 1980s
transformed the politics, law, and practice of corporate governance
in the United States (Bratton, 1989). Suddenly, the composition
and fiduciary duties of boards of directors became critically
important as target corporations defended themselves against
takeovers. Raiders and other takeover specialists carried the
rhetorical and ideological banner of shareholder value and
shareholder primacy in their legal and political struggle against
managerial defences.11 The market for corporate control was
heralded as the solution to corporate governance problems and as
embodying the passing of American capitalism from the era of
managerialism to one of shareholder capitalism.
Facing the prospect of hostile takeovers, corporate managers met
the limits of their tolerance for the market. Takeovers obviously
threatened managerial security and prerogatives. Coming at the
trough of American deindustrialization and in the wake of the
severe recessions of the early 1980s, hostile takeovers also raised
intense concerns over national economic decline and attendant
social disruption that galvanized broad-based political opposition.
Widespread suspicion of concentrated financial power, a crisis in
the industrial economy during the 1980s, and the mobilization of
politically powerful managers and local populist interest groups

10

See also Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78
(1977) (primary concern of the Securities and Exchange Act is disclosure, while
the substantive fairness of transactions is "at most a tangential concern of the
statute").
11
For the relationship between the contractual theory of the firm, shareholder
interests, and the rise of hostile takeovers, see id.: 1518-25.
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generated a potent policy backlash (Roe, 1993). Court decisions
significantly weakened fiduciary duties by sanctioning a plethora
of takeover defences. Many states, with the important exception of
Delaware, adopted harsh anti-takeover statutes. By the early1990s, hostile takeovers were few and far between, replaced by
friendly merger and acquisition deals that typically included
substantial benefits for incumbent managers and directors. The
backlash against takeovers set the stage for the politicization of
the law and practice of American corporate governance. As the
market for corporate control reached its political limits, attention
turned to other mechanisms of corporate governance to balance
and adjust the interests of corporate stakeholders. Managers,
institutional investors, shareholder groups, financial institutions,
financiers, and unions sought to enshrine their policy preferences
in the statutory law, regulation, legal doctrine, and “best
practices” of corporate governance. Yet the politics of corporate
governance and securities law during the 1990s revealed interest
group conflict and policy confusion that precluded substantial
reform.

B. THE SEC IN THE 1990S: BIPOLAR ACTIVISM
POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS

WITHIN

The conservative ascendancy and the takeover wave of the 1980s
heightened political conflict over corporate governance reform. As
a result, during the 1990s, the SEC was whipsawed between
managerial and pro-shareholder groups, along with their respective
political allies. In the political battles that ensued, the SEC got
little effective political support from shareholders. For one thing,
diffuse and fragmented shareholders face insurmountable
collective action problems that make unified and coherent action
12
in opposition to managers a near impossibility. These same

12

This fact reflects the core insight of Berle and Means’ classic 1932 work on the
separation of corporate ownership and control, which has informed much of the
political and economic analysis of corporate governance ever since. (Berle and
Means, 1932)
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collective action problems are magnified in the much larger
political arena and afflict the political strength and effectiveness of
shareholders as a class and as an (potential) interest group. Second,
the pro-shareholder forces were also split among themselves with
respect to their preferred mode of corporate governance reform.
One group favored expanded formal disclosure regulation, enforced
by the SEC (and to a lesser extent private litigation). The other
sought to encourage the monitoring of management and corporate
governance activism by institutional investors. The peculiar
vacillations of SEC policy during the 1990s reflected this political
and ideological conflict. From 1992 to 2000, the SEC under Arthur
Levitt, a Clinton appointee, and his Republican predecessor,
Richard Breeden, initiated a series of reforms to protect
shareholders by improving managerial accountability and financial
transparency—with mixed political and practical success.
In 1992, after several years of pressure from institutional investors,
the SEC under Breeden reformed its proxy statement rules to
encourage corporate governance activism among large
institutional investors by eliminating the requirement to disclose
communications among large shareholders, thereby making it
easier (and cheaper) for them to communicate with each other and
with management.13 The amendments unleashed the fiercest fight
over SEC rule changes in the agency’s history up to that time.14 In
contrast to the transparency and disclosure rules common in

13

See 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276, 48,283 (1992), Regulation of Communications Among
Shareholders, Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 CFR Pts. 240 & 249,
Release Nos. 34-31326; IC-19031; File No. S7-15-92 (October 22, 1992). See
Minow, 1991: 149 (arguing that previous federal corporate governance reforms
had been generally initiated internally by government agencies, but that
institutional shareholders drove the 1992 proxy reforms); see also Frenchman,
1993: nn. 2, 6 & 155-156 and accompanying text.
14
Over 1,700 comment letters flooded into the SEC and business attacks on the
proposal were even more heated than the statements in support. The rule
inflamed economic conflicts and ideological debates over the merits and
legitimacy of managerialism and the potential financial and governance power
of institutional shareholders. See Cioffi, 2002: pp. 210-212.
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American securities market regulation, the 1992 proxy rules
reduced disclosure obligations and represent an experiment in
structural regulation that altered intra-corporate power relations
by design to achieve the policy goal of increased monitoring and
governance activism by institutional investors. The 1992 proxy
rule changes appear to have encouraged greater governance
activism by institutional investors, but at the expense of
transparency. Institutional investors, with some notable
exceptions, preferred to voice their concerns and criticisms to
management in private communications that would not depress
the price of their stock holdings (See Zanglein, 1998). These
discussions and their contents no longer had to be disclosed in
proxy statements, at the risk of privileging large institutions over
small investors in access to information. The use of structural
regulation in this case exacerbated problems of transparency,
opportunism, and insider trading.
The SEC under Levitt pursued a more activist policy agenda
favoring small shareholders, but was most spectacularly and
soundly defeated in attempts to reform the accounting treatment
of stock options and to curb conflicts of interest in the accounting
industry in order to improve the accuracy of audits. Fearing that
accounting firms acting simultaneously as consultants and
auditors would compromise the integrity of their auditing in order
to generate and keep lucrative consulting contracts, the SEC
wanted to prohibit accounting firms from handling both auditing
and consulting work for publicly traded corporations. Accounting
firms enlisted allies in Congress to fight on their behalf and bring
legislative pressure on the SEC, until the regulatory proposal was
withdrawn.15 Likewise, the SEC under Levitt failed in its attempt

15

The regulation of accounting firms and their conflicts of interest became an
especially important issue following a 1994 Supreme Court decision that largely
abolished “aiding and abetting” liability, under which accounting and law firms
could be held liable for fraudulent statements and omissions by publicly traded
corporate clients. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
511 US 164 (1994). Without the threat of private litigation, SEC regulation was
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to require the expensing of stock options in corporate financial
statements managers growing rich on huge grants of stock options
and “New Economy” technology firms dependent on options as a
form of compensation enlisted bipartisan congressional and
executive branch support to quash the initiative.
However, the Levitt SEC was successful in pushing through a new
regulation that ended the practice of selective disclosure of
important business and financial information to favored analysts
and institutional investors. In response to the proposed reform, the
SEC received over 6,000 comment letters eclipsing the former
record set by the 1992 proxy reforms (SEC, 2000: § II A (1),
especially n. 9). One indication of the intensifying public salience
and conflict over corporate governance issues In August 2000, the
SEC shifted direction with the adoption of Regulation “Fair
Disclosure” (“Regulation FD”) (SEC, 2000). Regulation FD
prohibited selective disclosure of material information by
corporate managers to favored analysts, financial institutions, and
institutional investors if that information is not released to the
general public. The SEC promoted formal equality among
shareholders by addressing the problem of informational
asymmetries that disadvantage small investors vis-à-vis large
institutions. Further, Regulation FD expressly rejected private
litigation by shareholders and relied exclusively on SEC
enforcement.
The 1992 proxy reforms and Regulation FD reflect a fundamental
tension and confusion in SEC policymaking. They are at crosspurposes. Regulation FD undermined the SEC’s own 1992 proxy
reforms by limiting the ability of institutional investors to pursue
corporate governance activism through private communications
with managers and board members. The logic of monitoring by
institutional investors tends to conflict with the logic of equal

the only enforcement option remaining. Tort reform legislation in 1995 (see
Part III. A, below) authorized aiding and abetting suits brought by the SEC, but
not by private plaintiffs.
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access to information for all shareholders. More fundamentally,
the mechanisms of structural regulation may often conflict with
established forms of disclosure regulation. The tensions in SEC
policy and approaches to regulation were exacerbated by political
struggle between Republicans and Democrats over the regulation
of business and the growth of the regulatory state. An alliance
between political conservatives and managerialist interests sought
to curtail litigation and expand managerial prerogatives through
litigation reform. A more nebulous opposition alliance between
the political center-left, organized labor, and a number of
institutional investors and shareholder groups sought increasingly
stringent regulation to protect investors from fraud and
opportunism by financial and managerial elites. Contradictory
regulatory policies and rules embodied this conflict. The 1992
proxy rule amendments presumed that more intensive
communications between institutional investors and managers
would benefit all shareholders. Regulation FD presumed that such
communications fostered unfairness and insider trading. By the
end of 2000, these two dominant paradigms of corporate
governance regulation and reform had collided on the levels of
politics, law, and corporate practice.

III. THE POLITICS OF SECURITIES LITIGATION
REFORM IN THE 1990S
A. NEO-LIBERALISM AND STRUCTURAL EXPERIMENTATION:
THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995
Litigation has played a uniquely prominent role in American
securities regulation and corporate governance. Securities fraud
suits have long served as a major, if controversial, mechanism for
defining and enforcing shareholder rights in the United States.
Criticism of securities litigation began to intensify during the
merger and acquisition boom of the 1980s and the subsequent
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recession and bankruptcies of the early 1990s.16 Securities
17
litigation had steadily increased from the 1970s to the 1990s.
Firms were sued with greater frequency—often in response to
inevitable market fluctuations in the price of securities. In part,
the rise in litigation rates was due to the development of a
sophisticated plaintiff-side securities litigation bar that produced a
veritable litigation industry and provided substantial financial
backing to the Democratic Party. But the increase in litigation also
reflected the growing stakes and contentiousness of intercorporate battles, the expansion of securities fraud law into new
areas, and the increased use of sophisticated and often
manipulative financial practices. The rise in securities litigation
rates expanded the size of the anti-litigation coalition and the
intensity of its opposition to liberal securities laws and legal
doctrines. In addition to corporate managers, the traditional foes of
securities litigation, securities litigation reform legislation was
supported by of securities firms and accounting firms, along with
the economically ascendant Silicon Valley firms that depended
upon equity financing. (Avery, 1996: 339-54; Kelleher, 1998: 51-53)
By the early 1990s, these critics found both political parties
increasingly congenial to their pleas for legislative relief from
lawsuits. As part of a more business-friendly political strategy and
policy agenda, the Democrats had sought to neutralize the issue by
drafting more moderate reform legislation in 1993 and 1994 that
balanced the interests of corporations, shareholders, and plaintiffs’
18
Driven by interest group loyalties, political
attorneys.
calculation, and an increasingly hard-line ideological approach to

16

For an overview of the debate see Alexander, 1991; Seligman, 1996; for the
influence the debate over the incidence and excesses of securities litigation on
the drafting and passage of the PSLRA, see generally Avery, 1996.
17
The rate and significance of the increase in securities litigation has been, and
continues to be, hotly debated. See Alexander, 1991; Seligman, 1996; see also
United States Senate, 1993.
18
See Seligman, 1996: pp. 717-719; 140 Cong. Rec. S3685, S3696-3707 (daily ed.,
Mar. 24, 1994) (statement of Senator Dodd, co-sponsor of S. 1976).
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policy, the Republican Party pushed for more substantial legal
change. In 1993 the Republicans included securities litigation
reform a component with their “Contract with America”
campaign platform. After the 1994 “Republican Revolution,” in
which the right wing of the Republican Party took control of the
Congress under the leadership of Newt Gingrich, the party made
good on their promise.
The new Republican majorities in both houses of Congress shifted
the terms of the securities litigation reform debate to the right and
set to work drafting their own legislation. After three years of
fierce political conflict and an epochal shift in the control of
Congress, conservative congressional Republicans spearheaded the
passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(the PSLRA) over President Clinton’s veto.19 Intended to curtail the
use of the courts and litigation for the prosecution of securities
fraud claims, the PSLRA placed more stringent pleading
requirements on securities fraud suits in an attempt to streamline
the procedure for dismissing these suits before they entered the
expensive discovery phase (Securities Regulation & Law Reporter
(BNA), 1995). Its proponents hoped that the law would reduce the
settlement value of, and thus the incentive to file, weak or
meritless suits. President Clinton voiced general support for
securities litigation reform in the securities area, as did many
Democrats in Congress. However, he vetoed the legislation on the
grounds that it imposed an excessively stringent standard for
20
pleading securities fraud claims. The PSLRA became law as

19

PSLRA, Public Law: 104-67 (December 22, 1995), amending Title I of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77a et seq., Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995). For the Congressional veto override, see 141 Cong. Rec. S19,180 (daily
ed. Dec. 22, 1995) (Senate); 141 Cong Rec. H15,223-24 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995)
(House of Representatives). For the text of President Clinton's veto message, see
141 Cong. Rec. H15,214-15 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995). For background and
practical analysis of the PSLRA, see Clark, 1997: 386-388; Seligman, 1996.
20
Clinton, 1995; see Lewis, 1995. Clinton’s veto message objected that "the
pleading requirements of the Conference Report with regard to a defendant's
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Congress overrode Clinton’s veto by a vote of 319 to 100 in the
House and 68 to 30 in the Senate. The success of the veto
override—the only time Congress overrode a veto by President
Clinton during his two terms in office—reflected a sea change in
American politics and policy characterized by the hardening of
Republican opposition to private litigation, eroding support of
Democrats for private litigation as an enforcement mechanism,
and the growing political influence of corporate managers. The
political center gravity in Congress shifted decisively against
private litigation as a favored mechanism of policy enforcement.
The PSLRA also reflected the struggle to find alternative
enforcement mechanisms to replace private litigation. By the
1990s, policy makers were faced with a dilemma. Business and
professional interests had mobilized to form a powerful coalition
against securities lawsuits. Yet, lawsuits were a central
enforcement mechanism in the American securities law and
corporate governance machinery. The PSLRA embodies three of
the alternatives: (1) the use of institutional investors to monitor
plaintiffs’ attorneys on behalf of all shareholders; (2) reliance on
certified public accountants as informational intermediaries and
monitors of corporate finances, management and boards of
directors; and (3) litigation by the SEC rather than private
plaintiffs and attorneys. The first of these alternatives, and to
more limited extent the second, represented a nascent structural
turn in securities and corporate governance law. Rather than
prescriptive rules backed by the threat of litigation, private actors
would perform governance and enforcement functions in a largely
autonomous fashion through the deliberate design of institutional
relationships and incentives under law. Not only would expensive
and inefficient litigation be reduced, in some respects the
autonomy of the private sphere would be preserved and even
reinforced.

state of mind impose an unacceptable procedural hurdle to meritorious claims
being heard in Federal courts."
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The growing importance of institutional investors was evident in
the design of securities law enforcement mechanisms as
reconfigured by the PSLRA. The 1995 legislation created the
position of “lead plaintiff,” generally the shareholder with the
largest stake in the relief sought, that was expected to curb alleged
excesses in shareholder litigation.21 The provision gives the lead
plaintiff greater power to police shareholder securities litigation,
promote the swift disposition of meritless suits, and prevent
collusive settlements. The provision recognized the size and
corporate governance potential of institutional investors by legally
empowering them as an institutional counterweight to both
plaintiffs’ attorneys and to managerial power. Congress wishfully
saw institutional investors as a means of resolving the
enforcement problem. Institutional investors were cast
collectively as less disruptive, adversarial, and litigious agents of
market regulation. This image of self-regulation by rival capitalists
appealed to policy makers and managerial interests alike.
The interposition of institutional investors between the plaintiffs’
bar and defendant corporations produced unintended and
paradoxical results. (Securities and Exchange Commission, 1997)
Institutional investors initially had little interest in intervening to
terminate lawsuits and incur a possible breach of fiduciary duty
suit from other, smaller shareholders (Grundfest and Perino, 1997).
The expense and unpredictability of litigation and the fear of
potential liability to other shareholders displeased with their
conduct as lead plaintiff discouraged deep-pocketed institutional
investors from curbing securities litigation.22 Instead, they used
this new power to intervene with growing frequency in securities

21

PSLRA, § 27(a)(3)(A) & (B), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)(A) & (B); 78u-4(a)(3) (A) &
(B) (procedure and substantive criteria for appointment of “lead plaintiff”). This
provision was inspired by an inventive law review article by Weiss and
Beckerman (1995).
22
However, the more stringent standards the PSLRA imposed on the civil
procedure rules for pleading scienter did empower courts to curb securities
litigation. See, e.g., Sale, 1998; Johnson, 1997.
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litigation to prevent plaintiffs’ counsel from cutting opportunistic
collusive settlement deals with managers in meritorious cases,
thereby prolonging litigation and increasing the amount of final
settlements and damage awards (Johnson, 1997). Thus, the Act
simultaneously reformed securities litigation and increased the
power of the funds—but not in the way its sponsors anticipated.
The PSLRA’s use of auditors to detect fraud and the SEC civil
actions enforce the securities laws proved far less effective. As is
abundantly clear in hindsight, Title 3 of the PSLRA, which
contains the auditing and auditor disclosure provisions, failed to
address the basic conflicts of interest in the management-auditor
relationship and did not provide a functional structural alternative
to litigation as an enforcement mechanism. Instead, during the
late 1990s, auditing firms became—knowingly or unknowingly—
instrumental in the manipulation or outright misrepresentation of
corporate finances. The relatively hands-off regulatory approach to
the accounting industry failed to empower or compel it to play the
structural monitoring role purportedly sketched out for it by
Congress in the PSLRA. In part, the failure of Title 3 to improve
the quality of audits was due to the politics of litigation reform.
Auditor responsibilities under the PSLRA were enforceable by the
SEC alone, not by private litigation, and only when auditors filed a
report of suspected illegal activity. The Act was insufficient to
alleviate the conflicts of interest entrenched within the accounting
industry and auditor-client relationships.
More generally, SEC civil and criminal actions authorized under
the PSLRA23 failed to fill the enforcement gap left by securities
litigation reform. At precisely the time when the law placed
greater responsibility on the Commission to pursue enforcement,
the stock market boom of the late 1990s sent agency’s workload
spiraling upwards and the SEC’s budget lagged far behind the

23

See 15 U.S.C. § 77t(f) (authorizing SEC actions for “aiding and abetting
liability), 15 USC 78j–1(d) (SEC has exclusive authority to enforce auditor’s
duty to disclose fraud and penalize violations).
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demands placed upon it. The agency’s turnover and depletion of
skilled personnel soared during the 1990s and early 2000s as the
SEC’s budget condition and staffing deteriorated relative to the
increasing demands on its resources. Only after the surge of
destructive corporate finance scandals following the collapse of
Enron in 2001 did Congress take action to substantially increase
the SEC’s budget and authorize the hiring of enforcement
personnel. The PSLRA’s experiments with structural regulation
failed. But the law and subsequent legislation revealed a clear and
potent political realignment antagonistic to securities litigation.
The political constraints that precluded the adoption of litigationdriven enforcement mechanisms in securities regulation and
corporate governance law would even withstand the post-Enron
corporate governance crisis.

B. NEO-LIBERALISM THROUGH CENTRALIZATION: THE
SECURITIES LITIGATION UNIFORM STANDARDS ACT OF 1998
The failure of the PSLRA to effectively stem the flow of securities
fraud suits drove the Act’s proponents to redouble their efforts.
The federal character of the United States and its fragmented legal
and regulatory systems further impaired the effectiveness of the
federal securities litigation reforms. Although the number of
securities fraud lawsuits dismissed by federal courts rose sharply
from 13 to 30 per cent between 1995 and 2000, critics of litigation
asserted that the number filed in state courts had risen and would
continued to rise sharply (See Loomis, 2000; Caiola, 2000: nn. 183190 and accompanying text ). These suits were brought under
federal securities laws (over which the state courts had concurrent
jurisdiction) and under the states’ “blue sky” laws. These state
laws formed a parallel securities law regime available to plaintiffs’
attorneys as access to the federal courts was curtailed.
Congressional securities litigation reformers sought to close this
avenue, arguing that it circumvented the PSLRA and invited a
splintering of the legal standards governing publicly traded
corporations. However, to do so by preempting state laws, the
Republican right in Congress would have to directly repudiate
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their professed commitment to federalism and the devolution of
political and regulatory power.
24
Spurred on by arguments—and at best ambiguous evidence —that
the PSLRA had pushed securities litigation into state courts,
Congress passed the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
of 1998 (SLUSA) to close the alleged loophole.25 The SLUSA was a
second sweeping securities litigation securities litigation reform
bill that preempted the securities fraud provisions of state bluesky laws and granted federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over
securities lawsuits brought under federal law.26 This time the
Republicans had additional Democratic support, especially from
the California delegation that had become increasingly concerned
over securities suits against Silicon Valley corporations dependent
upon securities markets for raising capital.27 The bill passed in the
Senate by 79-21, carrying a majority of Democrats (26 to 19) and
only two Republicans voting against the measure, and in the
House by 319 to 82. Not a single Republican voted against the bill

24

See Caiola, 2000: nn. 186-190 and accompanying text.
SLUSA, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as interspersed
subsections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78). For analyses of the legislative history and
political ramifications of the SLUSA, see Thompson, 1999; Pritchard, 2000;
Caiola, 2000.
26
Two years earlier, Congress had enacted another—more modest—preemption
statute that conferred exclusive federal jurisdiction over the regulation of
securities registrations (i.e., the initial marketing and sale of publicly traded
stock). See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-290, 110 Stat. 3416; see especially 15 U.S.C.A. § 77r (West Supp. 1999). The
NSMIA conferred exclusive federal court jurisdiction over the primary subject
matter of the Securities Act of 1933. The SEC and Clinton administration
successfully fought off a Republican attempt to enact a far more radical
preemption of state securities regulation. See Seligman, 2003: pp. 674-681. The
SLUSA extended preemption to the primary subject matter of the much broader
and more important Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
27
See id. n. 190 (citing S. Rep. No. 105-182, at 4-5 (1998) (written testimony of
Commissioner of the California Department of Corporations that without
federal preemption and uniform rules the state with the most lenient securities
fraud law will govern in a national marketplace).
25
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in the House, while a majority of Democrats voted for it, 106 to
80. They also won the support of moderate Democrats in Congress
who were eager to cultivate high-tech industry support. Chastened
by the PSLRA veto override and acutely sensitive to the political
trends supporting litigation reform, the Clinton Administration
also signed on in support of the legislation (Clinton, 1998).
The SLUSA centralized regulatory authority over securities
markets in striking fashion. The political potency of the shift away
from litigious enforcement mechanisms and the growing political
power of anti-litigation constituencies overrode the sentiments
and rhetoric of conservative neo-federalism. Despite the title
emphasizing “uniform standards,” the main goal of the law was to
reduce litigation, not to create clearer or more coherent legal
doctrine. Though the centralizing effect of the PSLRA and SLUSA
collided with the entrenched structures of federalism in corporate
governance law, they preserved the overlap of state corporate law
with federal securities regulation. The SLUSA contained
provisions, called the “Delaware carve outs,” that explicitly
protected state fiduciary law and related derivative suits from
preemption. Federal securities litigation reform thus generated
opposing policy incentives: further fragmentation of corporate
governance law by inducing increased reliance on state corporate
law versus an even more radical intrusion of federal law into the
traditional core areas of state corporation law. It was in this
context of tension within and among policy approaches, and
conflict between political parties and coalitions that the great
1990s stock market bubble burst to reveal the shady practices,
mass delusion, and outright fraud that the economic boom had
concealed. The resulting legitimacy crisis would facilitate
corporate governance reform and disrupt established patterns of
regulation and federalism.
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IV. THE SARBANES-OXLEY REFORMS: CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE REFORM AND CONSTRAINED
AUTONOMY IN POLICYMAKING
A. THE LEGITIMACY CRISIS
THE POLITICS OF REFORM

OF

FINANCE CAPITALISM

AND

The politics of corporate governance reform in the United States
was driven by overwhelming external forces and events that,
paradoxically, endowed policymakers with a rare and short-lived
period of relative autonomy from established interest group
politics. The most severe legitimacy crisis of the American
financial and corporate governance systems since the Great
Depression inflamed political support for more wide-ranging
reform of the American corporate governance regime and
disrupted the grip of a conservative coalition that favored minimal
regulation and had blocked pro-shareholder reforms during the
1990s. Yet public support for reform remained unfocused and
detached from any specific concrete proposal, program, or policy
agenda. These conditions loosened the constraints of interest
group politics while increasing the autonomy of policymakers in
fashioning a response to the crisis. That response became the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
The corporate governance crisis revealed the necessity of strong
legal rules and regulatory institutions as the foundation of
functional, efficient private economic institutions—including both
markets and the non-market of the corporate firm (Vogel, 1996;
Cioffi, 2004b). Significantly, however, the law and the regulation it
enabled did not loosen legislative restrictions on securities
litigation, let alone create new causes of action. Instead, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act relied on a combination of governmental
enforcement and structural regulation to carry out its reforms.
Political dynamics and constraints drove the legislation in these
directions.
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Senate Democrats pushed through the most comprehensive
corporate governance reform in the United States since the 1930s.
This outcome can only be understood in the context of an
unusual—and temporary—interregnum of interest group politics.
The extraordinary scope, severity, and duration of these financial
scandals undermined the legitimacy of managerial and
professional elites and their political allies who opposed reform
and allowed the Democratic leadership in the Senate, where the
party held a short-lived majority prior to the 2002 midterm
elections, to seize the policy agenda of substantial corporate
governance reform. Under these conditions, they outflanked and
overrode the resistance to pro-shareholder reforms mounted by
congressional Republicans, the Bush Administration, and powerful
vested managerial and accounting industry interests.

B. THE TWIN FEARS: FINANCIAL COLLAPSE AND POPULISM
The euphoric dot.com bubble of the 1990s died a painful death, as
bubbles always do.28 The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell by 25
percent between its March 19, 2000 peak and July 19, 2002. The
Standard and Poor 500 index lost nearly 28 percent during the
same period.29 The Wilshire 5000 Index, among the most
comprehensive of American stock indexes, fell by over 40 per cent
from its March 24, 2000 peak of $17.25 trillion to $10.03 trillion
on July 18, 2001 (Feaster, 2002; Seligman, 2003: 624). The bursting
of the stock market bubble and the sustained impact of corporate

28

For a classic account of financial bubbles and crashes, see Kindleberger,
1989/1978. For an extremely insightful and prescient study of the dot.com
bubble of the 1990s published just before the American stock market crash, see
Shiller, 2000.
29

See Graham, Litan, and Sukhtankar 2002: 3. A further breakdown of these
losses indicates the importance of the disclosure of the WorldCom fraud. Fully
14% of the aggregate 25% DJIA loss occurred after the WorldCom disclosure on
June 24th. The S&P lost 15% of its 28% total loss from the date of the
disclosure. Id.
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scandals and bankruptcies from the collapse of Enron in December
2000 wiped out approximately seven trillion dollars of market
capitalization. According to one estimate, 17 per cent of these
losses were attributable to the wave of corporate finance scandals
(Graham, Litan, and Sukhtankar 2002: 2).
The crash not only destroyed investors’ portfolios, it also revealed
the manipulative and often outright illegal financial conduct of
corporate managers, accountants, financial institutions, and
attorneys. The precipitous decline of the stock markets drained a
swamp of misconduct that many suspected during the boom, but
few were willing to directly or clearly acknowledge.30 The crash
revealed the deterioration of the quality of accounting and
financial disclosure—followed by a collapse of public confidence in
the reliability of each. Joel Seligman notes that “[b]etween 1997
and 2001 the number of earnings restatements grew each year
from 116 in 1997, to 158 in 1998, 234 in 1999, 258 in 2000, and
305 in 2001” (Seligman, 2003: 624). After the collapse of the
markets, the prevalence and severity of the fraud, financial
engineering, earnings management, creative accounting, and other
dubious financial practices of the boom years came into focus.
The mass shareholding that had developed in the United States
during the 1980s and 1990s, once a key societal support for promarket policies, now fueled pervasive cynicism, resentment, and
finally fury against business, financial, and political elites.31

30

One hedge fund manager, who had correctly warned about Enron, commented
about the accounting scandals, "For the most part, this stuff was hiding in plain
sight[.]" (Berenson, 2002). Alan Greenspan had warned of “irrational
exuberance” in the stock market years before the crash and many academic and
financial commentators realized that the United States was in the midst of a
stock market bubble during the late 1990s. See, e.g., Shiller, 2000.
31

See, e.g., Gosselin and Flanigan, 2002; Norris, 2002; Financial Times, June 28
2002; Petruno and Yamanouchi, 2002; Morgenson, 2002; Nagourney, 2002;
Dunham, 2002.
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Business and neo-liberal deregulation lost their luster in both
ideological and political terms. The legitimacy of finance
capitalism itself appeared to teeter as the prestige and reputations
of principal political and economic actors plummeted. Investor
confidence in the securities markets collapsed along with stock
prices. Massive corporate finance scandals at Enron, Tyco,
WorldCom, Global Crossing, Adelphia, and other major
corporations, along with the enormous market losses, stoked
popular resentment of corporate and financial elites. Revelations
of managerial fraud, looting, and empire building punctured the
inflated cult of the CEO. The abuses and improprieties of
corporate managers also revealed the inadequacies of corporate
boards of directors, auditors and other informational
intermediaries, government regulation, and regulators. In the
harsh light of hindsight, boards of directors of defrauded, looted,
and bankrupt firms appeared at best negligent, and at worst
corrupt.
Key informational intermediaries, most importantly accountants
and stock analysts, failed to protect the public interest and
appeared mired in and hobbled by conflicts of interest. If Enron
symbolized the culture of corporate fraud and board failure during
the 1990s, its auditor Arthur Anderson represented the spread of
corruption to the self-regulating professionals entrusted to protect
the public interest in transparency. Likewise, stock analysts were
unveiled as shills for the investment banks that employed them,
and their stock ratings exposed as largely worthless and often
deceptive. From Enron’s collapsed in autumn 2001 through mid2002, an increasing percentage of the electorate began to view the
entire financial system as built on insider conflicts, fraud, and
manipulation—just as it unraveled in public.
Government did not escape the corrosive skepticism of the
souring public mood. Securities regulators and prosecutors had
failed to deter, detect, or punish managerial misfeasance and
malfeasance. Congress was also vulnerable to charges that it had
passed litigation reform legislation that intensified the pressures
on the SEC while failing to provide the funding necessary for it to
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function. The SEC itself was chaired by Harvey Pitt, a prominent
securities lawyer known for his representation of accounting firms
in private practice and an avowed skeptic of regulation. During the
1990s, congressional opposition in both parties had also rolled
back a proposal by FASB to require expensing of stock options and
an effort by the SEC to compel the separation of auditing and
consulting services by accounting firms. Boards turned out not to
be watching the CEOs, and no one was watching the watchers.
Corporate managers, directors, professionals, and government all
fell in the public’s esteem.
By the spring of 2002, some political and economic leaders began
to fear that the American financial system as a whole might
collapse. The wave of corporate finance scandals and bankruptcies
frayed public confidence in the soundness, stability, and
fundamental integrity of the financial and corporate governance
systems.32 Increasingly, the public perceived that the scandals
reflected fundamental corruption and dysfunction at the core of
the American corporate governance and political systems
(Graham, Litan, and Sukhtankar, 2002: 2). By late June, worries of
an international financial contagion increased as American,
British, French, and German stock markets each suffered doubledigit losses in the first half of 2002.
“Investor confidence” became a de facto metric of political
economic legitimacy in the context of the post-Enron corporate
governance crisis. Perhaps for the first time in American history,
the interests and perceptions of the investor class were viewed as

32

Enron collapsed just after the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, and
that the succession of post-crash scandals unfolded in the aftermath of that
catastrophe. The combination of the terrorist attacks and pervasive financial
scandals led policymakers in and out of Congress to fear the possibility of a
general collapse of the American and international financial systems. This
perception was repeatedly stated in interviews with congressional aides from
both parties.
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largely coterminous with those of the electorate at large.33 The
scandals and their increasing toll on the financial markets raised
the specter of a backlash against malfeasance and misfeasance
among corporate managers, directors, and the financial elite.
Populist backlash against financial elites is a recurrent theme in
American political and legal history. However, past episodes of
backlash in response to scandal and financial crisis had been
driven, or at least colored, by anti-financier populism.34
Yet, the post-Enron politics of reform was not so much antimanagement or anti-financier as it was pro-shareholder. This
reflects a substantial shift in the politics of corporate and financial
regulation in the United States. Integrity and fairness of the
markets, the adequacy of financial disclosure, and conflicts of
interest in corporate governance were increasingly judged by the
criteria of shareholder interests, rather than those of consumers,
local communities, workers, unions, or small business. The postEnron corporate governance crisis made clear that the legal rules,
market and corporate structures, and regulatory enforcement that
buttress shareholder interests and investor confidence had become
crucial to the legitimacy of the political economic order. A
striking fact about the American corporate governance crisis of the
early 2000s is that corporate governance reform was designed to
restore and reinforce the structural features of the American

33

This is not to argue that shareholder interests actually are indistinguishable
from those of the rest of the electorate. See, e.g., The Economist, October 19,
2000 (discussing the rise of an American “shareholder class” and Zogby data
indicating the distinctive interests and policy preferences of its members).
34

The work of Mark Roe (e.g., 1991, 1993, 1994), for example, details the myriad
restrictions placed on American financial institutions to fragment stock
ownership, markets, and lines of business. These measures were intended to
benefit shareholders, but they were driven by hostility to financial interests and
a desire to deliberately weaken them. In contrast, recent corporate governance
reforms do not seek to subordinate or disadvantage financial institutions. See
also Moran, 1991 (scandal triggers financial system reform).
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political economy as it had emerged from the 1980s, with its
market-centered financial system, preoccupation with shareholder
value, and financially driven corporate restructuring and
strategies. From this perspective, corporate governance reform was
not radical, but an essentially conservative response to crisis in a
conservative era.

C. THE RELATIVE AUTONOMY OF REFORM POLITICS
Sarbanes-Oxley was the product of a political struggle between
Democrats using financial scandals against the Republicans, and
Republicans seeking to delay or dilute the legislation in keeping
with their loyalty to corporate supporters and their anti-regulation
ideological policy agenda. The Democrats relied on public outrage
over the scale and scope of the financial scandals of the late-1990s
and its disruptive effect on interest group power.35 Given the
Republican Party’s control of the Presidency and House of
Representatives, and its greater unity and discipline within the
veto-prone structure of the federal government, substantial reform
was only possible under crisis conditions that weakened interest
group influence and made resistance to reform intensely
unpopular. Corporate governance reform in the United States was
as much a product of historical contingency as of underlying
structural changes in the economy.
Opponents of reform among interest groups and in the Republican
Party hoped to ride out the scandals without any major legislative
or regulatory initiative. Sensing political vulnerability from the
spreading scandals, the Bush administration announced a ten-point
plan to combat corporate corruption in early March of 2002
(Schlesinger and Schroeder, 2002). House Republicans led by
Michael Oxley, Chairman of the House Finance Committee,

35

See Cioffi, 2004b (forthcoming); Romano, 2004. For contemporaneous news
articles discussing the Democrats’ exploitation of popular outrage over the
scandals, see, e.g., Labaton and Clymer, 2002; Stevenson and Mitchell, 2002;
Clymer, 2002; Stevenson and Oppel, 2002.
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submitted a bill patterned after the Bush plan and began holding
36
hearings on it in mid-March. The bill, known as the Corporate
Accounting Reform and Transparency Act (CARTA), garnered
little praise from commentators and the public and derision from
congressional Democrats as an attempt to assuage the public with
symbolic legislation. CARTA was especially vulnerable because it
was supported by, and imposed relatively weak restrictions on, the
accounting industry. The bill created a new accounting regulation
body under the control of the SEC—then chaired by Harvey Pitt
who was viewed by Democrats as too sympathetic to the
accounting industry and major accounting firms. As the
accounting scandals continued to spread, any connection with, or
indication of sympathy with, the accounting industry became
politically poisonous. Early on, the Republicans knew they were
seen as close to business and financial interests and therefore
politically vulnerable on issues of corporate corruption. They
pressed forward with Oxley’s CARTA bill as a “marker” intended
to frame the legislative debate over reform and establish the
party’s bargaining position against the Democrats.37
Shortly after the Republicans began work on CARTA, Senate
Democrats, led by Banking Committee Chairman Paul Sarbanes,
began holding hearings on the scandals and potential legislative
responses to the crisis. Because they were completely shut out of
the Republican-dominated House legislative process, the
Democrats’ policy positions could only be channeled through the

36

Though named for both Democratic Senator Paul Sarbanes and Republican
Representative Michael Oxley, Sarbanes was the law’s chief architect and
congressional proponent. Oxley only signed onto the Sarbanes’ bill once the
White House chose to support passage of the Senate bill in order to control the
political damage that the GOP was beginning to incur as the November 2002
mid-term elections approached and the corporate scandals continued to spread.
Interviews, Washington, DC, March 2003, March 2004. Both Democratic and
Republican interviewees recounted this version of events. See also VandeHei,
2002 (Oxley criticizing the Sarbanes bill before conference committee).
37
Interviews, U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Senate, and former
congressional staffers, Washington, DC, March 2004.
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Senate where they held a short-lived one-vote majority following
38
Sen. James Jeffords’ defection from the Republican Party. Of the
numerous committees that held hearings on Enron and the
unfolding corporate governance crisis, however, the staid
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs took the lead
on accounting and corporate governance reform. The committee
had jurisdiction over the securities law and accounting issues that
were seen as central to the crisis.39 The Banking Committee was
the ideal place for a reform bill to originate if it was to have a
chance of passage. It had a reputation for relative collegiality and
technical sophistication.40 The technical focus of its members
(with some exceptions) favored a more sober and deliberate
legislative process less easily derailed by partisan rhetoric,
posturing, and ideology.
The populist backlash against the managerial and professional
classes triggered by the massive post-bubble corporate financial
scandals was conjured vividly in congressional hearings on the
scandals and debates over responsive reforms. In the more
ideologically-driven
and
rhetorically
astringent
House,
Representatives sought to outdo one another in their
denunciations of greed and corporate fraud and malfeasance.
Democrats sought to seize the political mantle of reform and
capitalize on the scandals by denouncing Republican neo-

38

This majority was precarious, and the public’s attention to and memory of
financial scandals was short. Following losses in the November 2002 mid-term
elections, both the Democrats’ control of the Senate and the public’s fixation on
corporate finance scandals were gone.
39
The Senate Judiciary, Commerce, Labor, Tax, and Investigations committees
held hearings on issues raised by Enron and the crisis of corporate governance,
but their jurisdictional competence was either too narrow or comparatively
peripheral to frame a comprehensive policy response.
40
Sarbanes, although on the left of the Democratic Party, commanded respect
across the aisle as very smart, tough “workhorse” legislator, and was so
described by interviewees inside and outside of government. Even many House
Republicans held him in high regard. Interviews, U.S. House of Representatives,
U.S. Senate, and former congressional staffers, Washington, DC, March 2004.

34

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 02 NO. 01

liberalism and systemic flaws in securities regulation and
corporate governance. The Republicans set out to neutralize these
attacks by adopting the rhetoric of shareholder value and
confidence while framing the scandals as a matter of a few “bad
apples” rather the product of structural flaws in regulation and
corporate governance.
The rhetoric of shareholder value filled the chambers of Congress.
Rep. Michael Oxley, the Republican Chairman of the House
Committee on Financial Services, introduced a hearing on
Republican sponsored reform legislation by arguing that,
“There should be no question that the Federal securities
laws need to be updated to ensure that investors have
access to transparent, and meaningful information
concerning public companies. Enhancing the public’s
faith in financial statements is absolutely critical. They
serve as the bedrock of our capital markets” (U.S. House
of Representatives, 2002a: 1).
The ranking minority member on the Committee, Democratic
Rep. John LaFalce of New York, made a similar point that
legislative reform was necessary to “restore confidence in the
integrity of our markets,” but also slipping in an attack on the
PSLRA and SLUSA.41
Similar language permeated the Senate debates over corporate
governance reform. Senator Sarbanes opened the Senate hearings
on reform legislation by positing, “It is commonplace, but
nonetheless worth repeating, that our markets depend on
investors’ confidence” (United States Senate, 2002, vol. 1,
February 12, 2002: 2). He uttered a stark warning in the second
hearing: “[T]here is, I think it is fair to say, a crisis of confidence”

41

U.S. House of Representatives, 2002a: 3-4; see also U.S. House of
Representatives, 2002b: 53-54 (Democratic critique of restrictions on securities
litigation and liability).
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(Id.: 97). A number of Democrats sharpened this general argument
into a slashing attack on the Republicans’ largely neo-liberal
domestic policy agenda, including litigation reform, which they
presented as pro-management, anti-investor, and increasingly
42
Republicans sought to
dangerous to economic stability.
neutralize the Democrats’ attacks and frame an alternative policy
position by using the same language of trust and investor
confidence. Michael Enzi, a Republican and the Senate’s only
certified public accountant, echoed the sentiment, arguing that
“the strength of our markets is only as strong as the underlying
confidence in the listed companies” and acknowledging the role of
government: “Congress and the SEC must find a middle ground…
We must continue to convince investors, that at the core of the
American capital markets, there must be a high level of integrity
and ethics by all players” (United States Senate, 2002, vol. 3:
1203).
Legislative results accompanied this rhetoric of shareholder
interests and investor confidence produced only because the
corporate governance crisis had generated conditions that
suspended interest group politics as usual. A striking and
important feature of the reform politics of 2001-2002 was the
disintegration of interest group influence and the predominance of
entrepreneurial political actors in Congress.43 Tainted by scandal,
corporate managers, accounting firms, and investment banks were
weakened within the legislative process. Corporate managers
remained peripheral to the legislative process as a result of their
loss of prestige and influence in the wake of successive corporate
scandals and the popular perception that they, as a class, had
looted American corporations and stolen from their shareholders.

42

See United States Senate, 2002, vol. 3: 1206-1213 (remarks of Sen. Reid), 12621263 (remarks of Sen. Wellstone), 1291-1292 (remarks of Sen. Durbin).
43
This analysis was originally developed in Cioffi, 2004b (forthcoming), see also
Cioffi, 2004a.
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Business interests were also deeply divided over reform. The
financial services sector was divided in their interests and
preferences concerning the proper extent of corporate governance
reform and government regulation of business and markets.
Financial institutions, such as investment banks, were split. They
are dependent on public faith in the integrity of the securities
markets, but are also privileged insiders that benefited from the
status quo and stood to lose from reform. In addition to intrasectoral divisions, financial institutions and service providers were
weakened in the political process by their alleged roles in
numerous scandals—such as dishonesty and conflicts of interests
in stock analysis, initial public offering and stock market
manipulation, and the aiding and abetting dishonest of corporate
executives.
The institutional investor community remained split over
legislative and regulatory reforms. Large public employee and
union pension funds (such as CalPERS and TIAA-CREF) and
institutional investor groups like the Council of Institutional
Investors, long involved in a largely non-regulatory and voluntarist
form of corporate governance activism, shifted their policy
preferences dramatically in support of increased regulatory
stringency and intervention in corporate governance. In contrast,
corporate pension funds and most mutual funds—either controlled
by or beholden to corporate managers—did not press for reform.
The AFL-CIO and labor unions were strongly supportive of
corporate governance reform. The reforms promised greater union
influence in corporate governance through their close connection
to union pension funds. Further, as representative organizations,
unions and the pension funds they helped administer sought to
protect their members’ reliance on private pension investments.
Finally, the unions’ historical antagonism towards management
(particularly where financial manipulation enriched bosses at the
perceived expense of workers) fueled an enthusiasm for reforms
that would curtail managerial power. But organized labor had little
impact on the substance of the reforms, though its representatives
were later instrumental in rounding up Democratic votes in
Congress for the final passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley bill. The
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influence of public pension funds and organized labor on the
content of the reforms, like that of other interest groups, was
minimal.
The split in the business community (never as homogenous an
interest group category as often implied) only widened as the
corporate scandals deepened. A significant number of leading
financial figures, including billionaire investor Warren Buffett,
former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, and Goldman
Sachs CEO Henry Paulson, publicly supported legislative and
regulatory reform (Smith and Craig, 2002). Leading investment
firms understood the depth and seriousness of the crisis, and they
had an enormous stake in ensuring that it was contained—by
regulatory reform if necessary. Likewise, the New York Stock
Exchange also came out in support of reform—also in order to
calm investors and restore confidence. The leading business
lobbying groups, the Business Roundtable and the Chamber of
Commerce divided over the proposed reforms. The Chamber of
Commerce, historically more ideological in its intense opposition
to government regulation, fought a rear guard battle against the
reforms. The Business Roundtable, the preeminent lobbying group
of corporate America, remained moderately opposed to reform. In
the end, however, even the Roundtable, whose membership of
predominantly large public corporations had long been opposed to
government (including judicial) intervention into corporate
governance, supported the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms. By late June
2002, the Business Roundtable’s President, John J. Castellani,
announced,
"We've passed the critical mass, both from the
standpoint of the political structure as well as the
erosion of confidence of the capital markets in corporate
America… It bodes for quicker and more intensive
action" (Stevenson and Mitchell, 2002).
The accounting industry, having much to answer for and fearing
even more to lose from reform, fought strenuously against the
legislation—even at the risk of further antagonizing public
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opinion—but were in no position to stem the tide of popular
opinion and political momentum. The large accounting firms,
down to the Big Four after the indictment, collapse, and
conviction (in that order) of Arthur Anderson, and the accounting
industry’s trade association (the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants) were tainted by association with scandal,
fraud, and conflicts of interest. Each of the Big Four was
implicated in scandals. Collectively, the industry had lost its
legitimacy as a profession. As the legislative process moved
forward, some Republican staffers on Capitol Hill even told
accounting industry lobbyists to stay away—their very presence
44
was politically damaging. By July 2002 one accounting industry
representative speaking to a senior congressional aide expressed
the views of many in an industry and profession besieged by
scandal, bad press, and a plummeting reputation: “Just make it
stop.”45
The discrediting of and division among economic elites and
interest groups increased the autonomy of policymakers. This left
the reformers in the Democratic Party remarkably unconstrained
by interest group politics and free to capitalize on the public
resentment of corporate managers and financial institutions in
pushing the reform legislation. The drafting and passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act were driven by Senate Banking Committee
Chairman Paul Sarbanes of Maryland. In contrast to the
Republicans in both the House and Senate, Sarbanes and a
majority of his fellow Democrats were favorably predisposed
towards reform. The Democrats’ slim Senate majority gave
Sarbanes the institutional power to frame and advance a specific
and technical legislative agenda. The Democrats draped their
concerns and proposals in the rhetoric of pro-shareholder fairness
and regulatory reform that was overwhelmingly supported by
public opinion. The Senate Banking Committee moved

44

Interview, former senior Republican staff member, House Finance
Committee, March 2004.
45
Id.
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deliberately through the winter, and more quickly during the late
spring, and early summer of 2002, as the scandals and the sense of
financial crisis among the public and the political economic elite
escalated.
By June 2002, the reform politics had taken on a life of its own
beyond the control of interest groups and even Congressional party
leaders. After cooling somewhat during the spring of 2002, the
sense of panic and outrage spiraled upwards again as the corporate
financial and accounting scandals culminated in late June with the
multibillion-dollar collapse of WorldCom, following disclosure of
a multi-billion dollar accounting fraud. The WorldCom collapse
finally eroded Republican resistance to Democratic legislative
reforms.46 Public demand for securities law and corporate
governance reform had become irresistible. The Bush
Administration and much of the Congressional Republican
leadership sought to neutralize the scandals as a potent November
2002 election issue by supporting corporate governance reform and
accepting only minor compromises from the Democrats as the
price (Associated Press, 2002; Oppel, 2002). One Republican staffer
on Capitol Hill summed up the end game of the behind-the-scenes
struggle over corporate governance reform: “Congress didn’t pass
Sarbanes-Oxley, WorldCom did.”47

46

The WorldCom fraud and bankruptcy decisively reinforced public perceptions
of systemic corruption and stoked both fear and outrage. See, e.g., Waters, 2002;
Chaffin and Bowe, 2002. For press accounts of the collapse of WorldCom see
Noguchi and Merle, 2002; Feder, 2003 ($3.8 billion fraud originally disclosed
later found to total between $9 and $11 billion). The WorldCom scandal focused
public attention once more on the passivity and conflicts of corporate directors
who enabled or at least failed to prevent managerial fraud and looting. See
Norris, 2003.
47
Interview, Washington, DC, March 2004. Interviewees inside and outside
government unanimously agreed that the WorldCom collapse broke Republican
resistance to the Sarbanes bill and made substantial corporate governance
reform politically inevitable.
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The question remains, why did the Democrats give up so potent a
campaign issue by pushing through the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms?
Some members of the Democratic Party leadership and organized
labor would have preferred that Congress not passed a corporate
governance reform bill in order to keep the issue of financial
scandal alive for Democratic candidates in the 2002 mid-term
elections. The Democratic leadership agreed to final passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act out of a combination of idealism and
calculation. Sarbanes and a number of allies argued that reform
could not be sacrificed for partisan political purposes given the
danger the scandals posed to the national and international
financial systems. In part, the Democrats chose to pursue good
public policy over tactical expediency.48 They also needed to
insulate themselves from charges of obstructionism, however. Had
they derailed the reform legislation just prior to the election, the
Democrats ran the risk of appearing to play politics with the
American economy. Even at the height of the scandals, the
Democrats received little credit from the public for their corporate
reform efforts (Nagourney, 2002; Dunham, 2002). The corrosive
effects of the corporate financial scandals on public confidence
fostered an all-embracing public cynicism towards American
economic and political institutions and elites that extended to
both parties.49 Either party would have faced intense public
hostility, and likely electoral losses if they appeared to have

48

In interviews, Republicans as well as Democrats described the motivations for
passing the act in these terms. Interviews, Washington, DC, March 2003, March
2004.
49

See, e.g., Gosselin and Flanigan, 2002 (discussing polls showing plummeting
public confidence). Although the Democrats had a slight edge in polls asking
which party could best reform business practices, the public’s undifferentiated
outrage deprived them of the decisive advantage over the Republicans they had
expected. As the corporate governance crisis reached its peak, a majority of poll
respondents did not believe that legislative reforms would accomplish
meaningful change. Id.
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V. STRUCTURAL REGULATION: THE POLITICS OF
CONSTRAINTS AND REGULATORY INNOVATION
At the height of the corporate governance crisis, interest group
politics loosened sufficiently to allow the Democrats to pursue
substantial reforms, but two fundamental constraints of partisan
politics remained more imposing. The first was the Republicans’
intransigence over adding or expanding any new shareholder rights
enforceable through litigation. The second was that reforms giving
shareholders a more direct and enhanced role in nominating and
electing corporate directors were off-limits. Preservation of
securities litigation reform was a non-negotiable item for
congressional Republicans. It was a “line in the sand” over which
they would have killed any reform legislation.50 Whereas the
Democrats were at best ambivalent about securities litigation, the
Republicans were almost universally intensely hostile to it. As a
result, Sarbanes did not even raise the issue of private causes of
action when drafting legislation. Sarbanes’ draft legislation never
contained new private rights of action. Nor did the legislative
debate present a serious effort, let alone a credible threat, of rolling
back the 1990s’ legacy of restrictions on securities suits. The
Republicans did not even have to fight to impose this constraint
on corporate governance reform. Even so, Republicans in the
House and Senate repeatedly expressed concern over any possible

50

Interview, senior Treasury Department official, Washington, DC, March 2004.
Sarbanes needed the support of Republican Senator Michael Enzi to report his
bill out of committee, and the Democrats knew any attempt to expand the use
or availability of private litigation was a “deal killer” for the Republicans.
Interviews, Washington, DC, March 2003, March 2004. The one exception was
an extension of the statute of limitations for securities fraud claims, which had
been substantially shortened by the Supreme Court. This was a controversial
issue, but one the Republicans could live with so long as the PSLRA’s
restrictions remained intact.
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increase in securities litigation as a result of corporate governance
51
reform down to the final vote on Sarbanes-Oxley.
Driven by intense and rapidly shifting political pressures for
reform, yet still constrained by the anti-litigation politics of the
1990s, the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms were effectively forced to
experiment with structural regulation.52 This followed not only
from the political logic of the situation, but also from
policymakers’ practical assessment of the unfolding corporate
governance crisis in 2002. Sarbanes and many of the Democratic
colleagues believed that this was a structural crisis, rooted in
accounting and conflicts of interest, and they would have to
53
fashion a structural solution to it.
Sarbanes-Oxley imposed a welter of new regulatory requirements
and prohibitions on publicly traded corporations, directors,
corporate managers, accountants, securities analysts, and
attorneys. This discussion focuses on the most important and
innovative provisions (Table 1, below).54 The most important of
these legal changes wrought by Sarbanes-Oxley were the creation
of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (the PCAOB),
and the reform of internal corporate board and management
structures to institutionalize improved corporate governance
within the firm. The PCAOB was a new private regulatory body,

51

See, e.g., United States Senate, 2002, vol. 3: 1620-1621 (comments by Sen.
Gramm).
52
Board reform, independent director requirements, and more stringent auditor
regulation, all later incorporated into the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, were not
themselves new and had been debated at length for many years in academic and
policy circles. However, but their enactment into law was a fundamentally new
step in the politics and the legal framework of corporate governance.
53
Interviews, Senate Banking Committee staff, Washington, DC, March 2004.
54
One important regulatory change that does not neatly fit into the scheme of
Table 1 and is left out is Sarbanes-Oxley’s mandatory separation of auditing and
consulting services. Although this could be considered a form of structural
regulation, it is more accurately described as enforced market segmentation to
reduce conflicts of interest.
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appointed by and under the oversight of the SEC, charged with
55
regulating the accounting industry. The creation of the PCAOB
federalized accounting regulation and displaced the self-regulatory
character of the accounting profession and the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) as the primary rule-making
body in the fields of accounting and auditing.
Table 1: Regulatory Features of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act:
Regulation Type
Regulatory
Structure/
Capacity
Transparency &
Disclosure Rules

Provision/Legal Requirement
• Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB),
• Increase in SEC budget.
•
•
•
•
•
•

Governmental
Enforcement &
Sanctions
Structural
Regulation

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

55

Heightened disclosure of corporate finances,
Disclosure of “off-balance sheet” transactions,
Disclosure of codes of ethics (and waivers by the board),
Disclosure of reconciliation of “pro forma” financial
results with generally accepted accounting principles (US
GAAP), and
Real time disclosure of material financial information
and developments,
CEO & CFO certification of accuracy of financial reports
& adequacy/weakness of internal controls.
Increased criminal and civil penalties on executives for
disclosure violations,
SEC enforcement of 3rd party aiding & abetting liability,
Extension of securities fraud statute of limitations.
Auditing committee comprised entirely of independent
directors, Qualified financial expert must sit on audit
committee,
Audit committee has direct responsibility for the
appointment, compensation, and oversight of the outside
auditors,
Audit committee must approve all auditor services,
Auditors must report directly to the audit committee,

The creation of the PCAOB was consistent with congressional conservative’s
preference for private institutions over governmental ones and enabled the new
entity to recruit staff from the private sector more effectively by offering
salaries far above the civil service scale.
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• Compensation committees of independent directors set
managerial pay,
• Board given legal authority to hire it own counsel and
consultants,
• Limitations on non-audit services performed by the
firm’s auditor (and board approval of permitted services),
• Develop, implement, and certify adequacy of internal
controls,
• Whistleblower protections.

The more innovative and path-breaking provisions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act are those using structural regulation to
intervene in the internal structure and affairs of the corporation.
Whereas the creation of the PCAOB extended traditional
transparency and disclosure regulation to the accounting industry,
the structural regulation provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley represent a
substantial expansion of federal power in the corporate governance
area. Although independent auditing committees have been
required under New York Stock Exchange listing rules, the
Sarbanes-Oxley board provisions are the first time that federal law
and regulation directly intervened in the composition, structure,
56
and operation of corporate boards. These issues had been within
the traditional preserve of state corporation law and the nominally
self-regulating stock exchanges. Public firms are now required to
appoint an auditing committee comprised entirely of independent
directors, and at least one member must be qualified as a financial
expert under new SEC rules. The audit committee now has direct
responsibility for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of
the outside auditors. The auditors report directly to the audit

56

Federal law had placed some rather minor restrictions on boards, such as the
ban on interlocking directorates under the Clayton Antitrust Act, but nothing
approaching those imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley. Likewise, New York Stock
Exchange listing rules adopted under SEC pressure had already imposed board
independence and committee requirements. However, Sarbanes-Oxley was the
first time federal legislation directly addressed the subject and, in doing so,
strengthened SEC authority and power.
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committee, which must resolve any disputes between
management and the auditors concerning financial reporting. It
must also approve all auditor services. Likewise, the boards of
public firms must now put in place independent compensation
committees that set managerial pay. Sarbanes-Oxley also
enhances the more general institutional capacities of the board by
giving it the legal authority to hire independent counsel and
consultants.
Finally, the law requires CEOs and CFOs to certify that the firm’s
accounts are accurate and in compliance with accounting rules.
Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley also requires that CEOs certify the
firm’s internal monitoring and risk management systems as
adequate to prevent accounting manipulation and fraud. In
practice, this provision compelled the thoroughgoing restructuring
of intra-firm managerial, monitoring, and reporting structures and
practices.57 Taken together, these provisions have imposed
unprecedented federal regulatory control over the inner workings
of the public corporation.
By encroaching on the traditional subjects of state corporate law,
the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms centralized and federalized key
aspects of corporate governance. This unprecedented federalization
of corporate law represents departs from nearly two centuries of
American federalism and left largely in place even at the zenith of
the New Deal.58 This break with such a long-established allocation

57

No provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has sparked more criticism than the
Section 404 internal risk management certification provisions. Ironically, this
provision has also been a boon to the accountants, who had to audit, assess, and
sometimes consult on the design of risk management systems. The law that
targeted the accounting industry has in at least one way enriched it
significantly.
58
Despite numerous critics who have asserted that Sarbanes-Oxley did not
substantially alter the legal terrain of corporate governance (e.g., McDonnell,
2003), others have emphasized the importance of this change in the scope and
balance of federal authority. See, e.g., Karmel, 2004 (former SEC commissioner);
Chandler and Strine (Delaware Chancellery Court judges).
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of policymaking power indicates both the growing practical import
and policy salience of corporate governance issues, along with the
extraordinary political impact of the financial and governance
scandals during 2001-2002 (Cioffi, forthcoming; Romano, 2004).
Together, these regulatory reforms represent not only a potentially
vast expansion of federal regulatory power, but also a substantial
centralization of regulatory authority. Federal law and regulation
have begun to displace traditions of federalism and the private
managerial autonomy that had characterized much of American
corporate governance. Sarbanes-Oxley thus represents both a
stunning reversal of the anti-regulation agenda of the 1990s and a
continuation of the skepticism towards private litigation as a
mode of regulatory enforcement. The result was an innovative
expansion of structural regulation.
Members of Congress were aware of the innovative nature of the
corporate governance reforms. They were also aware that the use
of structural regulation afforded them a solution the problem of
enforcement as well as the rapidly eroding legitimacy of American
corporate governance institutions. As one congressional staffer
described it, these structural fixes would be “self-executing” with
no need (or option) for litigation.59 The operation of the
institutional arrangement itself would be the enforcement.
Congress was also cognizant of its deviation from well-worn
customs of federalism that allocated corporate law to the states.
Indeed, Oxley discussed the issue with his staff repeatedly.60
However, even a majority of Republicans believed that the
securities markets, and thus corporate governance framework that
underpinned them, were pre-eminently national in scope and
importance.61 Federalism was again jettisoned when it got in the
way of practical politics.

59

Interview, Washington, DC, March, 2004.
Interviews, Washington, DC, March, 2004.
61
Id.
60
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The importance of structural regulation and board reform
implicates the second powerful political constraint on the politics
of corporate governance reform. Despite the significance and
sweep of the reforms, Sarbanes-Oxley did not reform how
directors are nominated and elected. The Act left the very
foundation of corporate governance and managerial power under
the control of managers. In a statute that relies to such a degree on
structural regulation utilizing board independence, this is a
striking omission. There are only intermittent references to the
subject in the legislative record. Surprisingly, given its importance,
there were but a few passing witness statements on the subject.62
Congressional Democrats were almost entirely silent on the
matter.63 Representative John LaFalce, then the ranking
Democratic member of the House Finance Committee and a fierce
critic of managerial abuses, merely noted that Congress did not
have address the issue because the SEC was empowered to adopt
64
rules governing the nomination and election of directors. Yet
during this period the Democrats were attacking the SEC under
Chairman Pitt as ineffectual and resistant to substantial reform.
The subject of board nominations and elections was simply too
explosive to handle.65 Any attempt to reform board nomination
and election rules would have mobilized the American managerial
elite against the Democratic Party and shifted its support even
more disproportionately towards the GOP. Because the
Democratic Party has become increasingly reliant on the support
of at least sections of the managerial class, this threat precluded a
fundamental challenge to the institutional bases of its power.

62

See United States Senate, 2002, vol. 2: pp. 1010-1011, 1026 (comments by
Sarah Teslik, Executive Director, Council of Institutional Investors).
63
Interviews with congressional staff confirm that the issue did not come up in
internal committee or partisan debates over the reform legislation. Interviews,
Washington, DC, March, 2004.
64
U.S. House of Representatives, 2002a: p. 55 (comments by Rep. LaFalce).
However, LaFalce’s bill, voted down by the House, did contain a provision
requiring a nominating committee comprised entirely of independent directors.
65
This assessment was confirmed by a former senior Republican congressional
aid. Email communication, February 1, 2005.
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Moreover, Sarbanes’ priority was to pass the best bill possible
under the circumstances. Prior to the WorldCom scandal, it was
not clear that Sarbanes would even get his bill out of committee,
let alone passed by the full Senate, reconciled with the House bill,
and signed by President Bush. If a litigation provision would have
killed it, so too would a foundational reform of the corporate
power structure.

VI. THE BUSINESS BACKLASH: RETURN TO POLITICS
AS USUAL?
A. THE BACKLASH BEGINS
Ultimately, the SEC, under the Chairmanship of Pitt’s successor,
William Donaldson, advanced a rather weak proposal to reform
corporate proxy voting on board nominations and elections in
October 2003. This proposal triggered a backlash by business
against Sarbanes-Oxley and the regulatory reforms that followed it
that vindicated the Democrats’ reluctance to address the issue in
the first place.66 This backlash and the election of November 2004
would bring the post-Enron reform era to an effective end. The
Sarbanes-Oxley reforms were the product of exceptional, and by
definition temporary, circumstances that short-circuited interest
group and institutional politics as usual. With the ebbing of the
corporate governance crisis, the dynamics and interest group
balances of “normal” politics was restored. (Cf. The Economist,
July 15th 2004)
The business backlash had been simmering almost since the
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Three general factors

66

Legal scholar Mark Roe (1998) has written about “backlash” politics against
business caused by left-wing or populist mobilization against financial and
corporate interests. But backlash can work in the other direction, especially in a
political system, such as that of the United States, where business and financial
elites wield so much power and influence. This was the case as business
interests pushed back against corporate governance reform during 2003-2004.
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contributed to the backlash: (1) the perceived burdens of the new
law and regulations, (2) managers’ hostility to regulatory
constraints on their autonomy, and (3) the balance of partisan
67
politics at the national level. Less than four months after the
passage of the Act, and days after the Republican gains in the 2002
congressional elections, Robert R. Glauber, chairman of the selfregulating National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD),
advocated delay in implementing new regulations as he spoke out
against "unduly bureaucratic" solutions to securities analyst
conflicts of interest on Wall Street and their “onerous” costs to
securities industry (White, 2002). By Sarbanes-Oxley’s first
anniversary, one year after the peak of the accounting scandals, a
former head of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants fumed that Sarbanes-Oxley represented “the
criminalization of [corporate] risk taking, which is the same as
criminalizing capitalism.”68
A growing number of business representatives and neo-liberal
commentators had begun to voice what would become an
increasingly familiar litany of complaints about reform:

67

•

High compliance costs, including increased audit fees and
“directors and officers” (D&O) insurance premiums,

•

Reducing the number of qualified people willing to serve on
boards,

The focus of this essay is on federal politics. This neither denies nor
denigrates the significant developments in reform and enforcement efforts at
the state level. State attorneys general, led by New York State Attorney General
Elliot Spitzer, have been increasingly active in these areas and repeatedly have
been the first to uncover and remedy an increasingly wide variety of financial
improprieties throughout corporate America—often to the acute embarrassment
of federal regulators.
68
Schroeder, 2003 (quoting Robert Elliott, a former KPMG partner and former
head of AICPA).
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•

Discouraging domestic firms from going public and
inducing public firms to go private,

•

Discouraging foreign firms from listing on American stock
exchanges,

•

Slowing investment and growth.

•

Encouraging excessive risk aversion by management,

With the exception of increased D&O insurance and auditing fees,
empirical and anecdotal evidence did not support these criticisms.
One leading corporate governance consultant ridiculed the
complaints as a bunch of “urban myths,” and Treasury Secretary
John Snow dismissed them out of hand.69 Even the increased
auditing fees did not appear to be significant in the broader context
of corporate cost structures.70 Even so, polls of corporate
executives revealed growing managerial skepticism and outright
hostility towards corporate governance reform and regulation
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2003).
By mid-2004, the business backlash against corporate governance
reforms had gathered momentum (Johnson and Birnbaum, 2004). A
proposed SEC reform of proxy rules to give shareholders the (very
limited) ability to nominate and elect corporate directors
mobilized and intensified a growing managerial backlash against
corporate governance reform. The fight over board nominations
and elections went to the very core of corporate governance and
managerial power in the United States and triggered far fiercer and
broader opposition. Because the logic of structural regulation
under Sarbanes-Oxley depends on improving both the
representational and monitoring function of boards, the proposed

69

Id. (quoting Patrick McGurn of Institutional Shareholder Services).

70

Id.

2006]

IRRESISTIBLE FORCES AND POLITICAL OBSTACLES

51

proxy rule amendments would supply a foundation for the
Sarbanes-Oxley reforms that they heretofore lacked.
Two other issues were particularly prominent in the increasingly
vocal managerial hostility towards reform: (1) the expensing of
stock options under newly proposed accounting rules, and (2) the
difficulties and expense of complying with the internal control
certification requirements of section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley.
Neither triggered broad-based resistance to corporate governance
reform. Opposition to the mandatory expensing of stock options
was concentrated in the high-tech industry—most business
interests had long concluded that this battle had been lost and that
expensing would come, probably sooner rather than later (See, e.g.,
Norris, 2004; Spinner, 2003b). Nor are the section 404 internal
monitoring requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley the stuff of an
enduring anti-regulation backlash. Although the costs and burdens
of section 404 compliance were and are not trivial, most managers
of large publicly traded firms accepted them and many managers
saw potential benefits of improved managerial capacity through
better internal monitoring. The most politically powerful business
interests were therefore not intensely opposed to section 404.
Also, now that most of these internal control systems are in place,
many of the costs and complaints generated by section 404 will
likely diminish (Cf. Byrnes, 2004; Roberts, 2004a, 2004b; The
Economist, 2004b). Managerial hostility to section 404 remains
more pronounced among the managers of smaller public firms, but
this does not explain the broader backlash against corporate
governance reform. Significantly, neither the SEC nor Congress
made any effort to roll back the internal monitoring or
certification requirements of section 404. But the SEC’s
shareholder voting reform proposal was something else entirely.

B. BACKLASH VICTORIOUS: THE FAILURE
SHAREHOLDER VOTING REFORM

OF THE

SEC’S

Following the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC under William
Donaldson, Harvey Pitt’s successor as SEC Chairman, engaged in a
historic run of rulemaking. The agency strengthened financial and
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proxy vote disclosure, accounting rules, and stock exchange
regulation. It extended structural regulation directly to mutual
funds in response to a series of fund governance scandals by
mandating board independence from fund advisors such as
Fidelity, Putnam, and Vanguard by requiring a majority of
independent directors on fund boards. The SEC also pushed into
the opaque and largely unregulated world of hedge funds by
requiring their registration with the agency—eliciting protests that
this was the first step towards more comprehensive regulation.
Under SEC pressure and with its approval, the stock exchanges
further stiffened their listing rules on board independence and use
of independent board auditing, nomination, and compensation
committees.71
None of these initiatives proved as controversial as the board
nomination rules proposed by the SEC in October 2003 (Securities
and Exchange Commission, 2003b). Earlier, in May 2003, the
agency had solicited comments on the subject from “interested
parties,” in anticipation of proposing a rule on the subject
(Securities and Exchange Commission, 2003a). The reaction was
immediate. Hundreds of comments poured in from business
groups, professional associations, corporate attorneys and law
firms, institutional investment funds, and shareholder advocates.
By the time the comment period closed on the proposed rules the
SEC had received over 13,000 comment letters, by far the largest
number regarding any rule in the Commission’s history (Securities
and Exchange Commission, 2004; Peterson, 2004a).

71

Chandler and Strine, both judges of Delaware’s powerful and enormously
influential Court of Chancellery, note (2002: n.12) that the listing rules are a de
facto component of federal securities regulation and, increasingly, of the
federalization of corporate governance law more broadly. They go on to argue, in
the context of a defense of Delaware’s corporation law and doctrine, that
Sarbanes-Oxley does not expand the SEC’s powers over firms’ internal
governance affairs or over exchange listing rules. (Id.: n. 57) The statute’s
provisions regarding independent directors and board committees, at a
minimum, suggest the opposite, but they are correct to raise the question of
how far the SEC’s authority now extends.
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The proposed proxy rules would have allowed institutional
investors access to corporate proxies mailed to all shareholders
only after substantial delays and under exceptional conditions.
The proposed rules would create a two-step, multi-year process to
place shareholder board nominations on the corporation’s formal
proxy ballots. First, at least 35% of voting shareholders would
have to withhold their support for a company's director candidate
in an annual board election. If this criterion is satisfied, a group
representing at least 5% of shares would be able to nominate and
run its own nominee(s) on the corporate proxy the following year.
Even then, the proposed rules would allow dissident shareholders
to elect no more than a minority of three directors in this fashion.
This is almost certainly insufficient to substantially change the
functioning of boards and suggests that corporate boards, however
restructured, will remain ineffective as checks on managerial
power.
The ferocity of opposition to the SEC’s rather feeble proposal
indicates the extraordinary sensitivity of board nomination and
election rules and the strength of the gathering managerial
backlash. Whereas divisions enfeebled interest groups and
empowered policymakers during the debate over Sarbanes-Oxley,
they were now far more unified—and polarized. Managers,
business groups, and allied organizations attacked the proposed
rules as destructive of corporate efficiency and an invitation to
public and union pension to use their vast holdings to conduct
divisive campaigns and pursue special interest agendas. Both the
Business Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce publicly
opposed the rules, with the Chamber threatening to sue if they
were adopted. Institutional investors, unions, shareholder and
consumer advocates, and a number of state treasurers publicly
supported the changes, but some argued that the proposed rules
were too weak to make a practical difference in who oversees the
county’s largest corporations (Peterson, 2004a).
The conflict escalated in the run up to the 2004 presidential
election. Opponents intensified their attack on the proposed rule
while the Bush administration reportedly weighed in against it
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behind closed doors.72 The SEC commissioners themselves split
over the issue, with the Democratic and Republican
commissioners increasingly bitterly divided at 2-2. Donaldson,
denouncing the “escalating, shrill, and fearful rhetoric” of interest
group battle, largely sided with the Democrats in support of the
rule, but sought a compromise that neither side supported
(Johnson, 2004a). By July 2004, Donaldson conceded that the SEC
was deadlocked over the board nomination proposal (Labaton,
2004b; Peterson, 2004b). Its fate would turn on the election
(Peterson, 2004c).
Proponents of the board nomination reforms saw their last chance
for such a fundamental reform slipping away. They knew a BushGOP victory would spell the end of the effort. The two
Democratic SEC commissioners were due to step down after the
election, and would almost certainly be replaced with
commissioners less supportive of reform. A Bush victory would
also leave the Republicans in the White House and Congress free
to more directly attack the proposal. In an unusually vituperative
public statement, Democratic Commissioner Harvey Goldschmidt
attacked the managers who had fought the proposal to a standstill:
“The commission's inaction to this point has made it a safer world
for a small minority of lazy, inefficient, grossly overpaid and
wrongheaded CEOs…the worst instincts of the CEO community
have triumphed” (Peterson, 2004c).
As soon as the November 2004 election ended in a Bush victory
and an augmented Republican majority in the Senate, postmortems for the board nomination proposed started appearing in
the news. By January 2005, news items reported that the plan was
dead (Peterson, 2004d; Johnson, 2004b). Corporate governance
reform reached its high-water mark, and it was left in a structural

72

See Labaton, 2004a; see also Orol, 2004 (indicating the continuing internal
ferment and uncertainty over the final form of the rule at the SEC).
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state that preserved the institutional foundations of
managerialism. The failure of the SEC’s proposal to give
shareholders more power to nominate and elect corporate directors
brought a brief era of reform to a close. Under intense pressure
from administration and congressional conservatives, under fire by
business groups, and his reform agenda criticized and blocked by
increasingly hostile Republican SEC Commissioners, SEC
Chairman William Donaldson faced a deteriorating and untenable
political position. He resigned in early June, 2005. Within hours of
Donaldson’s resignation, President Bush nominated Rep. Chris
Cox—the principal author of the original House securities
litigation reform legislation in 1995 and a vocal critical of
regulation—to replace him. While Donaldson’s resignation as
Chairman of the SEC formalized the end of the corporate
governance era, the Cox nomination underscored the close
structural and political connection between legislative curbs on
securities litigation and the limits of corporate governance reform.
The failure of the SEC’s proxy voting reforms suggests that
Sarbanes-Oxley’s structural components will have a less
significant impact on corporate governance and managerial
behavior than their proponents hoped for and their critics feared.
The benefits of board independence have long been the subject of
intense academic debate.73 A long historical record of lackluster
board performance by individuals working part time and with
little knowledge of the details of a firm’s business has fueled the
skepticism of many commentators towards claims that director
and board independence would improve governance.74 Indeed,

73

For critical reviews of this literature, see, e.g., Romano, 2004; Bainbridge,
2002.
74
A sizeable empirical literature, beyond the scope of this essay, casts doubts on
the claimed benefits of independent directors. However, it should be noted that
these critics assume that behavior patterns are static. Past patterns of conduct
predict future ones regardless of contextual and institutional changes. It is quite
possible that directors and boards will respond to the recent reforms and the
new corporate governance environment by treating the position as more of a
real job requiring relevant expertise, greater expenditures of time, and
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empowering shareholders through board independence may
reinforce the short-termism of American finance and corporate
management and serve a primarily value extracting function by
increasing returns without improving other measures of
performance. In retrospect, not only have Sarbanes-Oxley’s
structural reforms run aground politically on the status quo ante,
they largely followed and reinforced the liberal market trajectory
that has long characterized the American political economy and
its financial system in particular. (See, e.g., Zysman, 1983: ch. 5)
In this sense, the economic criticisms of corporate governance
reform are beside the point. The reforms were shaped by political
forces, not economic ones, just as politics maintained a flawed
corporate governance regime that was so conducive to the
financial scandals of the 1990s. These same political forces
ultimately undermined the internal logic of structural regulation
premised on board independence and shareholder representation.
In the end, American managerialism has been modified by reform,
yet it has demonstrated its political resiliency.

VII. CONCLUSION
Viewing the structural logic of securities law and corporate
governance reforms stretching from the 1990s to the present, we
can trace an enduring shift in American politics and regulatory
policy. Hostility towards private litigation may have begun on the
Republican right, but it achieved bi-partisan support that placed
firm political limits on regulatory policymaking going forward.
The problems of enforcement created by this aversion to litigation
fostered an accelerating trend towards employing structural
regulation that alters the structure of the corporate form and the
internal operation of governance practices to address problems of
governance. Paradoxically, this emphasis on structural regulation

independent outside professional advice. Of course, such changes will raise the
price of directors’ services. Scattered evidence suggests this may be happening
in practice.
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led policymakers to tinker with some of the most basic and
sensitive power relations in any capitalist society in ways that
blurred the division between the public and private spheres.
However, this blurring of regulation of the structure of the
corporate form triggered resistance that revealed the political
limits of reform. Even at the height of the corporate governance
crisis, the fundamental reform of corporate power structures, such
as that implied by the SEC’s proxy reform proposal, was politically
impossible. By failing to address how boards are actually
nominated and elected, the corporate governance provisions of
Sarbanes-Oxley, which rely so heavily on the independence of
directors and board committees, were left with a weak foundation.
The true political sensitivity of these structural aspects of
corporate and managerial power became apparent in 2003 and
2004 as the SEC set out on its ill-fated effort to reform the rules
governing board elections left untouched by Congress in 2002.
The failure of either Congress or the SEC to carry corporate
governance reform to its logical conclusion (or where it should
have started in the first place) by giving shareholders a meaningful
role in nominating and electing directors highlights some basic
characteristics of policymaking and reform politics in the United
States. First, the very structure of the federal government and
pluralist interest group politics makes it exceedingly difficult to
pass major reform legislation under ordinary political and
economic conditions. Second, crises provide the conditions that
allow critics and reformers to break through the bottlenecks and
veto points of politics as usual, but only for the usually brief
duration of perceived emergency. Accordingly, reform and
institutional development proceeds in a pattern of punctuated
equilibrium, with periods of sudden, episodic, and crisis-driven
reform led by state actors. Third, even under crisis conditions,
structural and political constraints on policymaking do not
disappear. Markets and the institutions on which they depend may
fail, at times spectacularly, but the underlying dynamics of
institutionalized interests and political constraints persist.
Established patterns of interest group politics usually swiftly
reassert themselves. When politicians expect that the enfeebled
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condition of interest group politics is temporary, and that interest
group politics as usual will soon return, powerful interest groups
retain influence. Their most basic interests inform political
constraints on policymakers who fear mobilizing a potent
constituency on behalf of the opposition. Further, some issues are
non-negotiable. Even when interest groups and their political allies
are weakened, they will fight fiercely when fundamental interests
are at stake. When they are willing to pay the short-term political
price of using the machinery of government to block reform, these
constraints harden and would-be reformers may not bother to
openly challenge them.
Corporate governance reforms in the United States exemplify this
pattern of punctuated change within powerful, implicit, and
largely unchallenged constraints. Senate Democrats never openly
challenged the premises or policy of securities litigation reform or
managerial control over board nominations and elections. The
reformers on the SEC ran afoul of these constraints. Donaldson
and the Democratic SEC Commissioners believed the reform
momentum generated in 2001-2002 would persist for years, and
gambled that it would permit them to pursue ever more
fundamental structural changes. The struggle over the board
nomination and election rules illustrates how corporate
governance has become an important policy arena and partisan
political issue, fought over with the intensity that belies its
technical character. It also shows that politics is back to normal.
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